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The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity.
Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff
of an individual will not be much lower than average. Herding instincts and crowd behavior in humans and
social animals also compel to conformity on their own right. Motivated by these facts, we here study the
impact of conformity on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that an appropriate fraction
of conformists within the population introduces an effective surface tension around cooperative clusters and
ensures smooth interfaces between different strategy domains. Payoff-driven players brake the symmetry in
favor of cooperation and enable an expansion of clusters past the boundaries imposed by traditional network
reciprocity. This mechanism works even under the most testing conditions, and it is robust against variations of
the interaction network as long as degree-normalized payoffs are applied. Conformity may thus be beneficial
for the resolution of social dilemmas.
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1. Introduction
Not only are social interactions limited and thus best de-
scribed not by well-mixed models but rather by models en-
tailing networks [1–5], it is also a fact that these interactions
are not always driven by a selfish agenda such as fitness max-
imization [6, 7]. Although a high individual fitness, which is
most often quantified by a scalar payoff value, is at the heart of
success in evolutionary games [8–13], social interactions are
often aimed also at fostering the general sense of belonging-
ness and the identification with a particular group or a way of
thinking, with a subculture, or even with a fashionable trend
or movement [14]. And one of the most common actions for
achieving this is simply to comply or to conform with the most
widespread and established ideas or ideals of the reference
group to which one aspires to.
Despite of the fact that payoff maximization is a surpris-
ingly apt description of interactions among simpler forms of
life, such as bacteria and plants [15, 16], as well as among
viruses [17], and thus rightfully permeates evolutionary game
theory, the consideration of alternative targets, especially for
interactions among humans and social animals, appears to be
justified. Of particular relevance in this case are social dilem-
mas, where the interests of individuals are at odds with what is
best for the society as a whole, and none has received as much
attention as the prisoner’s dilemma game [18–37]. Each in-
stance of the game is contested by two players who have to de-
cide simultaneously whether they want to cooperate or defect.
The dilemma is given by the fact that although mutual coop-
eration yields the highest collective payoff, a defector will do
better if the opponent decides to cooperate. A purely rational
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payoff-driven player should thus always decide to defect.
Ample research has already been devoted to the identifica-
tion of mechanisms that may lead to a cooperative resolution
of social dilemmas. Classic mechanisms are reviewed in [38],
among which network reciprocity due to Nowak and May
[39] has motivated an impressive array of studies aimed at
understanding the evolution of cooperation in structured pop-
ulations [40–44]. Methods of statistical physics have proven
particularly suitable for this task, as evidenced by the sem-
inal studies of the evolution of cooperation on small-world
[45, 46], scale-free [47, 48], coevolving [49, 50], hierarchi-
cal [51], bipartite [52], and most recently also on multilayer
networks [53–57]. Moreover, many coevolutionary rules [42]
have been introduced that may generate favorable interaction
networks spontaneously [29, 58–64]. There is also experi-
mental evidence in favor of the fact that a limited interaction
range does play a prominent role by the evolution of coopera-
tion [65, 66], especially so if coupled with rewiring [67].
The key assumption behind existing research, however, has
been that every player aspires only to maximizing its own pay-
off, although this is obviously not always the case. In fact,
there exist compelling evidence in favor of the fact that con-
formity also plays an important role [14], especially among
humans and social animals. The consideration of conformity
dictates the adoption of the strategy that is most common
within the interaction range of the player, regardless of the ex-
pected payoff [68, 69]. By adopting the most common strat-
egy, the conformists thus coordinate their behavior in a way
that minimizes individual risk and fosters coherence within
the population. Unlike previous research, however, we do not
assume that this “cultural transmission” affects all the players
in the population uniformly [69]. Instead, we take into ac-
count the fact that players are diverse in their aspirations, and
that thus some are keen on maximizing their payoffs while
others are simply content by adopting the most common strat-
egy in their neighborhood. Interestingly, such behavior has
2recently also been observed in the realm of an economic ex-
periment involving the public goods game with institutional-
ized incentives [70].
The question that we therefore wish to address in the con-
tinuation is: What is the impact of conformity-driven play-
ers on the evolution of cooperation in evolutionary social
dilemmas? In particular also, what role does the fraction of
conformity-driven players within a population play? One may
expect that conformity-driven players will push the system to-
wards neutral evolution, especially when they represent the
majority of the population. But interestingly, this is not always
the case. In what follows, we will show that the introduc-
tion of conformists to the prisoner’s dilemma game enhances
network reciprocity, and thus favors the evolution of coop-
eration. In particular, we will demonstrate how conformity-
driven players introduce spontaneous flocking of cooperators
into compact clusters with smooth interfaces separating them
from defectors. Furthermore, we will elaborate on the respon-
sible microscopic mechanisms, and we will also test the ro-
bustness of our observations. Taken together, we will pro-
vide firm evidence in support of conformity-enhanced net-
work reciprocity and show how conformists may be beneficial
for the resolution of social dilemmas. First, however, we pro-
ceed with presenting the details of the mathematical model.
2. Evolutionary games with conformists
We study evolutionary social dilemmas on the square lattice
and the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network, each with an av-
erage degree k = 4 and size N . For the generation of the
scale-free network, we implement the standard growth and
preferential attachment algorithm [71]. Accordingly, starting
from a small number of vertices (m0 = 3), a new node with
m = 2 edges is connected to an existing node xwith probabil-
ity Π(kx) = kx/
∑
y ky , where kx denotes the degree of node
x. This growth and preferential attachment scheme yields a
network with an average degree kav = 2m, and a power-law
degree distribution with the slope of the line equaling≈ −3 on
a double-logarithmic scale. The two considered networks are
representative for the simplest homogeneous and the strongly
heterogeneous interaction topology.
Each player is initially designated either as cooperator (C)
or defector (D) with equal probability, and each instance of
the game involves a pairwise interaction where mutual coop-
eration yields the reward R, mutual defection leads to pun-
ishment P , and the mixed choice gives the cooperator the
sucker’s payoff S and the defector the temptation T . We pre-
dominantly consider the weak prisoner’s dilemma, such that
T > 1, R = 1 and P = S = 0, but we also consider the true
prisoner’s dilemma in the form of the donation game, where
T = 1 + b, R = 1, P = 0 and S = −b.
We simulate the evolutionary process in accordance with
the standard Monte Carlo simulation procedure comprising
the following elementary steps. First, according to the ran-
dom sequential update protocol, a randomly selected player x
acquires its payoff Πx by playing the game with all its neigh-
bors. Next, player x randomly chooses one neighbor y, who
then also acquires its payoffΠy in the same way as previously
player x. Once both players acquire their payoffs, then player
x adopts the strategy sy from player y with a probability de-
termined by the Fermi function
Γ(Πx −Πy) =
1
1 + exp((Πx −Πy)/K)
, (1)
where K = 0.1 quantifies the uncertainty related to the strat-
egy adoption process [40, 72]. In agreement with previous
works, the selected value ensures that strategies of better-
performing players are readily adopted by their neighbors, al-
though adopting the strategy of a player that performs worse
is also possible [73, 74]. This accounts for imperfect infor-
mation, errors in the evaluation of the opponent, and similar
unpredictable factors.
To introduce conformity, we designate a fraction ρ of the
population as being conformity-driven, and this influences the
strategy adoption rule. In particular, each conformists x sim-
ply prefers to adopt the strategy that is most common within
its interaction range. Equation 1 thus no longer applies. In-
stead, if player x is a conformist, we use
Γ(Nsx − kh) =
1
1 + exp((Nsx − kh)/K)
, (2)
where Nsx is the number of players adopting strategy sx
within the interaction range of player x, while kh is one half of
the degree of player x. It is worth pointing out that the applica-
tion of Eq. 2 results in the conformity-driven player adopting,
with a very high probability, whichever strategy (either C or
D) is at the time the most common in its neighborhood. Nev-
ertheless, it is still possible, yet very unlikely that a conformist
will adopt the strategy that is in the minority. If, however, the
number of cooperators and defectors in the neighborhood is
equal, the conformity-driven player will change its strategy
with probability 1/2.
In terms of the simulation procedure, we note that each full
Monte Carlo step (MCS) consists of N elementary steps de-
scribed above, which are repeated consecutively, thus giving
a chance to every player to change its strategy once on aver-
age. All simulation results are obtained on networks typically
comprising N = 104 − 105 players, although the usage of
larger networks is necessary in the proximity to phase transi-
tion points. We determine the fraction of cooperators fC in the
stationary state after a sufficiently long relaxation time lasting
up to 105 MCS. To further improve accuracy, the final results
are averaged over 400 independent realizations, including the
generation of the scale-free networks and random initial strat-
egy distributions, for each set of parameter values.
3. Results
Before presenting the results in structured populations, we
summarize briefly the results in well-mixed populations. In
the prisoner’s dilemma game defectors dominate completely
in the absence of conformity-driven players. But if all play-
ers are conformists, then everybody looses interest in payoffs
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FIG. 1: Evolution of cooperation in the weak prisoner’s dilemma
with conformity-driven players, as obtained on the square lattice in
dependence on the temptation to defect T and the density of con-
formists ρ. The color map encodes the stationary fraction of co-
operators fC . While, expectedly, fC decreases with increasing T
values, it can also be observed that the dependence of fC on ρ is
nonmonotonous, especially for intermediate values of T . The bell-
shaped outlay of fC on ρ is due to conformity-enhanced network
reciprocity as ρ > 0 on the one hand, and the strategy-neutral rela-
tion of conformists in the absence of payoff-driven players at ρ = 1
on the other hand.
and the evolution is simply a random drift. Consequently, the
system may terminate into an all−C or an all−D phase, ulti-
mately yielding an average fraction of cooperators fC = 0.5.
The intermediate region is more interesting, where two differ-
ent cases have to be considered separately. If ρ < 0.5, the
majority of players is still driven by payoffs, and the system
thus eventually terminates into an all−D phase. If ρ > 0.5,
however, the majority of players is conformity-driven, mean-
ing that either an all−C or an all−D phase will ultimately
emerge among them, thus giving rise to fC = 0.5 · ρ. In sum,
in the low ρ region defectors always dominate, while in the
high ρ region the average cooperation level can never exceed
0.5, and this regardless of the value of T .
In structured populations, the presence of conformity-
driven players has significantly more unexpected and even
counterintuitive consequences. We begin by presenting results
obtained with the weak prisoner’s dilemma on the square lat-
tice. The color map presented in Fig. 1 encodes the stationary
fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the temptation to
defect T and the fraction of conformity-driven players within
the population ρ. It can be observed that the introduction of
conformists is able to sustain cooperative behavior at values
of T that are well beyond those reachable with traditional net-
work reciprocity alone. More specifically, if the value of ρ
is sufficiently large, cooperators are able to dominate in the
population up to T ≈ 1.5. In comparison, when conformists
are absent, at ρ = 0, the maximally attainable level of coop-
eration is only fC = 0.64 at T = 1, and moreover, defectors
dominate completely above T = 1.037.
A closer look at the results presented in Fig. 1 reveals also
that too many conformity-driven players could impair the evo-
lution of cooperation because among them the evolution of
strategies becomes neutral. Accordingly, at ρ = 1 the popu-
lation will terminate into a homogeneous all C or all D state
with equal probability, thus yielding fC = 0.5 on average.
Together with the upward trend in fC as ρ increases above
zero, the neutral strategy evolution at ρ = 1 gives rise to a
bell-shaped, nonmonotonous dependence of fC on ρ, which
is particularly pronounced at intermediate values of T . Based
on the results presented in Fig. 1, we may thus conclude that
it is beneficial for the whole society if the majority of the pop-
ulation consists of conformity-driven players. Nevertheless, a
certain fraction of payoff-driven players is necessary to induce
symmetry-breaking along the interfaces that separate compet-
ing strategy domains. The role of conformists is hence simply
to homogenize the population locally, while the role of players
seeking to maximize their payoffs is to reveal the long-term
benefits of cooperation and thereby to guide the expansion of
clusters in the socially desirable direction.
To illustrate the microscopic dynamics behind the described
conformity-enhanced network reciprocity, we show in Fig. 2 a
series of characteristic strategy distributions that describe the
time evolution of the game from a random initial state. For
clarity, we use different colors not only for cooperators (blue)
and defectors (red), but also for distinguishing conformity-
driven (pale) and payoff-driven (dark) players. From the out-
set, defectors spread very efficiently, and indeed only a small
flock of cooperators is able to survive (panel b). The com-
pact cluster protects the cooperators from extinction, and this
is in fact a very typical time evolution for an evolutionary
game that is contested in a structured population. What dis-
tinguishes this cluster from an ordinary cluster that would be
due solely to network reciprocity is its smooth interface that
separates the competing domains. In fact, the dynamics be-
tween conformity-driven players is conceptually similar to the
so-called majority-voter model [75]. It is easy to see that the
larger the fraction of conformity-driven players the smoother
the interface between the competing domains. Put differently,
the propensity of players to comply introduces an effective
surface tension around cooperative clusters that is completely
absent in traditional voter models, where rough interfaces and
slow coarsening are common [76]. Evidently, due to the neu-
tral strategy evolution among conformists, the conformity-
induced homogenization alone is just a double-edge sword,
but payoff-driven players brake the symmetry in favor of co-
operation.
When payoff-driven players are rare, the symmetry-
breaking due to them can be analyzed in more detail by zoom-
ing in on the most likely elementary steps along the interface
that separates cooperators and defectors, as shown in the inset
of Fig. 3. In the absence of payoff-driven players (dark colors)
the most stable interface separating conformity-driven players
(pale colors) is a straight line where the most likely change
happens at a step. The position of this step propagates ran-
domly until a payoff-driven player is encountered, at which
point imitation becomes a possibility. The most probable el-
ementary steps are depicted in the inset of Fig. 3. As noted,
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FIG. 2: Evolution of cooperation from a random initial state un-
der the influence of conformity. Depicted are characteristic spatial
patterns, as obtained with the weak prisoner’s dilemma game on a
square lattice using T = 1.45 and ρ = 0.81. Payoff-driven coopera-
tors (defectors) are depicted dark blue (dark red), while conformity-
driven cooperators (defectors) are depicted bright blue (pale red).
Starting from a random initial state (panel a), conformity-driven
players introduce spontaneous flocking of cooperators into com-
pact clusters with smooth interfaces separating them from defectors
(panel b). Payoff-driven players subsequently reveal the long-term
benefits of cooperation and the cluster grows, all the while maintain-
ing surface tension and thus a smooth interface (panel c). The effec-
tiveness of this conformity-enhanced network reciprocity eventually
propels cooperators to near-complete dominance (panel d). For clar-
ity, we have here used a small square lattice with linear sizeL = 100.
conformity-driven players at the step, marked by tilted lines,
are able to change their strategy with probability 1/2. More
interestingly, payoff-driven players are able to adopt another
strategy, yet they cannot pass their strategy by utilizing their
“success” because neighboring conformity-driven players do
not care about higher payoffs. Accordingly, the most prob-
able invasions are only those marked by white arrows. By
summing up these elementary processes, we can estimate the
time variation of the fraction of cooperators according to
∆fC
∆t
=
(
Γ(2T − 3R)−
1
2
)
+
(
1
2
− Γ(2R− 2T )
)
, (3)
where the Γ function is defined as in Eq. 1. We plot ∆fC
∆t
in
dependence on the temptation to defect in Fig. 3. The result
suggests that cooperation will spread below a threshold value,
even if T > R, as a consequence of the broken symmetry
described above. Indeed, this simple approximation is able
to explain why there is a relatively sharp transition between
the full C and the full D evolutionary outcome in the high ρ
region (see Fig. 1).
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FIG. 3: The inset features a schematic presentation of two typical in-
terfaces that separate competing domains when payoff-driven play-
ers (dark colors) are rare. In the complete absence of such players,
conformity-driven players (pale colors) would build perfectly smooth
(straight) interfaces. In their presence, however, the interfaces might
be modified by the most likely elementary steps, which are marked in
the figure as follows: those conformity-driven players who are at the
edge of a moving interface (marked by tilted-line boxes) can change
their strategy with probability 1/2, while payoff-driven players are
most likely to imitate a strategy along the direction of white arrows.
These elementary steps determine the leading terms in Eq. 3. Main
panel shows the time derivative of the fraction of cooperators den-
sity in dependence on T , according to Eq. 3, that is due solely to the
above-mentioned elementary processes. It can be observed that only
for T > 1.25 the tide shifts in favor defectors.
We proceed by testing the robustness of conformity-
enhanced network reciprocity, first by considering an alterna-
tive formulation of the social dilemma. So far, to obtain results
that are comparable with previous related works [77, 78], we
have focused on the weak prisoner’s dilemma, which does not
constitute the most adverse conditions for the successful evo-
lution of cooperation since the punishment for mutual defec-
tion and the suckers payoff are equal (P = S = 0). To amend
this, we consider the donation game, where the payoff ranking
T > R > P > S corresponds to the true prisoner’s dilemma.
The consideration of this game is all the more interesting be-
cause network reciprocity alone is virtually unable to sustain
cooperation under such testing circumstances [39]. As for the
weak prisoner’s dilemma in Fig. 1, for the donation game too
we present a color map that encodes the stationary fraction
of cooperators fC in dependence on the temptation to defect
T and the fraction of conformity-driven players ρ in Fig. 4.
It can be observed that, even in the most challenging social
dilemma, conformity-enhanced network reciprocity is able to
ensure widespread dominance of cooperators at remarkably
high values of T , as long as the value of ρ is sufficiently large.
However, as ρ → 1, the lack of payoff-driven players intro-
duces the status quo among conformity-driven players, and
again the average fraction of cooperators drops to fC ≈ 0.5
and thus gives rise to the bell-shaped, nonmonotonous depen-
dence of fC on ρ.
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FIG. 4: Evolution of cooperation in the donation game (true pris-
oner’s dilemma) with conformity-driven players, as obtained on the
square lattice in dependence on the temptation to defect T and the
density of conformists ρ. The color map encodes the stationary frac-
tion of cooperators fC . Results are qualitatively similar to those pre-
sented in Fig. 1 for the weak prisoner’s dilemma game, thereby con-
firming the robustness of the enhanced network reciprocity to vari-
ations in the contested social dilemma. It is also worth noting that
network reciprocity alone is practically unable to sustain cooperation
in the donation game if T > 1, which indicates that the identified
conformity-enhanced network reciprocity works well even under the
most testing conditions.
Lastly, we explore the robustness of conformity-enhanced
network reciprocity to changes in the topology of the inter-
action network. Since the square lattice is representative for
regular, homogeneous interaction networks, the most interest-
ing test involves considering the highly heterogeneous scale-
free network. First, we have to emphasize that the considera-
tion of absolute payoffs on strongly heterogeneous networks
already provides ample support to network reciprocity, in par-
ticular by ensuring homogeneous strategy “clouds” around
hubs [22, 47]. The introduction of conformity-driven play-
ers is therefore either negligible or even negative. Namely,
if a defective hub is designated as conformity-driven, then
it is almost impossible to revert its strategy to cooperation
because the large number of like-minded defective followers
will always assure the hub it already conforms perfectly with
the neighborhood. Since previous research has highlighted
the main cooperator-promoting mechanism on scale-free net-
works is based on the fact that defective hubs eventually be-
come weak and thus vulnerable to strategy change [40], the in-
troduction of conformists can be a notable drawback because
this key mechanism becomes disabled.
However, since the application of absolute, cumulative pay-
offs on strongly heterogeneous interaction networks already
raised questions during the early stages of research on this
subject [79–81], in particular in the sense that a player might
be unable to maintain a large number of connections for free,
the application of degree-normalized payoffs was proposed. It
was shown that the application of such payoffs erases the abil-
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FIG. 5: Evolution of cooperation in the weak prisoner’s dilemma
with conformity-driven players, as obtained on the scale-free net-
work in dependence on the temptation to defect T and the density of
conformists ρ. The color map encodes the stationary fraction of co-
operators fC . The change in the topology of the interaction network
also leaves the results qualitatively unaffected, thus further corrobo-
rating the robustness of the identified conformity-enhanced network
reciprocity. Importantly, we have here applied degree-normalized
payoffs. If absolute payoffs are applied on strongly heterogeneous
networks, then the heterogeneity alone provides the maximal sup-
port to network reciprocity, and hence the impact of conformity is
either negligible or even slightly negative (not shown).
ity of heterogeneous networks to sustain large homogenous
cooperative clusters around hubs, and that the cooperation lev-
els return to those observed earlier on regular networks and
lattices. With this, we arrive yet again at conditions where the
presence of conformity-driven players might help cooperation
significantly, and indeed the results presented in Fig. 5 fully
confirm this expectation. All qualitative features remain the
same as by the consideration of the weak prisoner’s dilemma
and the donation game on the square lattice (compare with
Figs. 1 and 4), and with this we conclude that conformity-
enhanced network reciprocity is also robust against variations
of the interaction network as long as degree-normalized pay-
offs are applied.
4. Discussion
We have studied the evolution of cooperation in social
dilemmas where a fraction of the population has been desig-
nated as being driven by conformity rather than payoff max-
imization. Unlike in traditional evolutionary game theory,
these conformists are no longer concerned with maximizing
their payoffs by selecting the most promising strategy for fu-
ture interactions. Instead, conformity-driven players simply
adopt whichever strategy is most common within their interac-
tion range at any given time. We have shown that the presence
of conformity-driven players enhances network reciprocity,
and thus aids the favorable resolution of social dilemmas. The
6effectiveness of conformity to do so, however, depends on
the fraction of conformists within the population. If the later
are neither too rare nor too common, the flocking of coop-
erators into compact clusters with smooth interfaces emerges
spontaneously. But since the strategy preference among con-
formists is neutral, a certain fraction of payoff-driven players
is necessary to induce symmetry-breaking along the interfaces
that separate competing domains. Based on this, we have
demonstrated that cooperative clusters are able to expand past
the boundaries imposed by traditional network reciprocity, in
particular because the dynamics between conformity-driven
players is conceptually similar to the so-called majority-voter
model [75]. We have emphasized that the larger the fraction
of conformity-driven players, the smoother the interface be-
tween the competing domains. In other words, the tendency
of conformist to blend in introduces an effective surface ten-
sion that does not exist in traditional voter model where rough
interface and slow coarsening can be observed [76].
We have shown that the newly identified mechanism is ro-
bust to variations of the contested social dilemma, and that
it works even under the most testing conditions where tradi-
tional network reciprocity completely fails to sustain coop-
erative behavior. Moreover, we have shown that conformity
promotes cooperation regardless of the properties of the in-
teraction network, as long as degree-normalized payoffs are
applied. If absolute payoffs are applied on strongly hetero-
geneous networks, then the heterogeneity alone provides the
maximal support to network reciprocity, and hence the impact
of conformity-driven players is either negligible or even neg-
ative. If namely by chance a defective hub is designated as
conformity-driven, then it is almost impossible to revert its
strategy to cooperation, and this thus disables the key mecha-
nism that ensures elevated levels of cooperation in heteroge-
neous networks [40].
The presented research has been motivated by the fact that
payoff maximization alone is often not the primary goal of so-
cial interactions. Unlike interactions among simpler forms of
life, interactions among humans and social animals are often
driven by a desire to belong or to “fit in” [14]. To conform is
thereby simply a frequently used way for achieving this goal,
and it is interesting and to a degree counterintuitive to dis-
cover that conformity may actually promote the evolution of
cooperation. Our results of course take nothing away from
payoff maximization as an apt and in fact comprehensive mo-
tivator of interactions among bacteria, plants and viruses, but
they do suggest that conformity might had an evolutionary ori-
gin in as far as it furthers prosocial behavior. Furthermore, in
addition to possible emotional origins of being a conformist,
there might be cases when this preference is actually a payoff-
maximizing strategy (by avoiding punishment, for instance).
Hence conformism may be a good heuristic in social decision
making [82, 83].
We conclude by noting that our model is just an initial
step towards the introduction of “multi-target” evolutionary
games, which ought to properly take into account the diver-
sity of not only the applied strategies, but also the diversity
of individual targets one may hope to achieve by adopting
them. An interesting direction for future research might in-
volve players being able to change their motivation over time,
for example through “cultural transmission” [68]. Relative
times scales in evolutionary dynamics [84] could also play an
important role, in the sense that the typical time for “moti-
vational change” might be different from the typical time in
which players change their strategy. To explore the conse-
quences of these options appears to be an exciting venture
with many relevant implications, and we hope that this pa-
per will motivate further research along this line in the near
future.
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